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In the Complement of deny 
L. M. Tovena 
1 A Case of Reading Alternation with Marked Preference 
It is commonly agreed that the negative predicate deny licenses negative polar-
ity items in its sentential complement, see (1), and such a possibility is mostly 
assumed not to exist for the NP complement, see (2). 
(1) She denied she had taken anything. 
(2) *She denied anything. 
However, the conviction of such an impossibility results from an oversim-
plification of the linguistic data. As observed by Tovena (1993), deny licenses 
polarity sensitive (PS) any in direct object position when the NP contains a 
mass or an event noun, cf. (3), more rarely when it contains a countable noun. 
In (4), the primary reading of any is as a free-choice item (FC). 
(3) She denied any knowledge of the plot. 
(4) She denied any accusations. 
Furthermore, the polarity sensitive reading obtains with count nouns if it is 
not possible to establish a discoursive link (Tovena, 1998), i.e. the intersection 
between the noun and the domain of discourse must be empty at the time of 
the utterance, see (5). 
(5) a. Ms Higuchi moved out of the presidential palace, but then moved 
back in. Her husband in tum left the official residence to move 
into the army intelligence headquarters. So far Ms Higuchi has 
denied any plans for divorce. (The Guardian, 14/911994) 
b. Defence officials from a number of NATO member countries 
have denied any link between illnesses among Balkan veterans 
and uranium weapons. (www.cnn.com, 411/2001) 
c. The US denied any wrongdoing in Afghanistan. 
This paper focusses on the alternation in reading preference for any-phrases 
in NP complement of transitive deny exemplified in (3) to (5). The analysis 
U. Penn Working Papers in Linguistics, Volume 10.1, 2004 
172 L.M. TOVENA 
proposed builds on two points: the predicate involved in these sentences does 
not imply the existence of its object, and the structure of the domain of de-
notation of the noun in object position supports more or less easily such an 
implication. 
2 A Brief Reminder of a Few Significant Facts on the 
Licensing Power of deny 
Many semantic treatments of polarity sensitivity rest on some form of the 
claim that NPis are licensed in the scope of monotone decreasing operators. 
In the eighties and nineties, they have been seen to have difficulties in explain-
ing the contrast between examples (1) and (2), which might suggest that deny 
is unable to license in clausemate position, as already noted by Linebarger 
(1980). 
A contrast of that type has been used by syntactic approaches, put forward 
by Progovac (1988) and Laka Mugarza (1990), as evidence for the claim that 
a licenser like deny, which licenses NPis in its restrictive clause, only does so 
across a clausal boundary. These authors claimed that occurrences of any in 
NP complements had to be interpreted as FCis, which for them corresponded 
to a wide scope universal quantifier. 
Progovac argues that adversative predicates are 'indirect' licensers. She 
claims that 'the element responsible for NPI licensing with these verbs is 
the polarity operator in Spec of Comp of their complements, and not the 
verb itself.'(Progovac, 1988:145) The choice of the position Spec of Comp 
for the surface null polarity operator is based presumably on analogies with 
wh-phenomena. Laka Mugarza (1990:180-181) also argues that adversative 
predicates do not license directly. They select complementizers that have the 
feature [+neg]. The licensing of the NPI inside the clausal complement takes 
place indirectly, via the feature on the head of the complementizer. The pu-
tative licensing failure is established on the basis of some criteria for telling 
apart licensed NPis from 'free' items similar to Carlson's (1981). 
The analysis adopted by Laka consists of differentiating clausal comple-
ments subcategorised by adversative predicates from those embedded under 
'non-negative verbs', as proposed also by Progovac. The two syntactic pro-
posals differ in a few points. One point is the specification of what in the CP 
projection is responsible for the licensing and its positioning. Another point 
is the level of representation at which licensing takes place. Progovac's treat-
ment is a mix of SS and LF licensing, whereas in Laka's licensing takes place 
exclusively at SS. 
IN THE COMPLEMENT OF DENY 173 
A similar position with respect to the putative reduced licensing power of 
deny, but motivated on semantic ground, has been defended by Kas (1993). 
Like in the syntactic approaches mentioned above, the strategy followed by 
Kas consists of characterizing the whole NP direct object of negative predi-
cates as a non-licensing position. The upward monotonicity of negative verbs 
with respect to their direct object NP is argued for on the basis of the patterns 
of inference in (6). Deny is classified as an 'extensional' verb. However, the 
ambiguity of the weak determiner a has an impact on inferences where sub-
set relations are expressed by adjectival modification (To vena, 1998: 173). A 
minister can utter (7a) with the intention of denying the possibility of a con-
siderable increase qua increase. This is the case considered by Kas where (7a) 
implies (7b). But if the minister intends to deny only the large size of the 
increase, the inference from (7a) to (7b) does not go through. 
(6) a. George denied a horrible crime -+ George denied a crime 
b. George denied a crime f+ George denied a horrible crime 
(7) a. The minister denied a considerable tax increase 
b. The minister denied a tax increase 
As mentioned above, the non-licensing claim was first disproved by 
Tovena (1993) who showed that NPis may occur in direct object position on 
the basis of data such as (3), more generally both readings are possible, but the 
PS reading is more likely to emerge with mass and event nouns, whereas the 
FC reading is favourite with countable nouns. 
To the other extreme of the spectrum of claims on the licensing power of 
negative predicates, Hoeksema and Klein (1995) have argued that the distribu-
tion of any's Dutch cognate einig, that has an existential and a PS reading but 
no FC reading, should be taken to provide evidence for a PS interpretation of 
all the occurrences of any in NP complements. 
Finally, Tovena (1998) has shown that count nouns are not necessarily 
incompatible with a PS reading of any. She draws attention to the relevance 
of D-linking (Pesetsky, 1987) in creating the conditions for a PS reading of 
any with count nouns, on the basis of data like in (5). This observation is part 
of her claim that any is not possible when the truth of the sentence where it 
occurs depends on the identity of the individuals that constitute the reference 
domain, what is called the Non Individuation constraint. 
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3 Scales, Existence and Interpretation Variation 
A peculiarity of the pair of sentences (3) and (4) is that they contain the same 
verb, an any-phrase in the same syntactic position, they do not differ with re-
spect to the presence/absence of other operators, and still they exhibit different 
reading preferences. 1 
In the literature, we find a discussion of another case of double reading of 
any in the NP complement of the same verb in Fauconnier (1975). This paper 
is a classic contribution on the issue of scalar implicatures, in particular it deals 
with the possibility for certain expressions to play the role of scalar endpoint 
with maximal strength in scales on which inferences run in either direction, 
and with the possibility of building such bidirectional scales with certain pred-
icates. Fauconnier draws an analogy between the logical properties of any, 
mainly its 'universal' vs 'existential' readings, and properties of superlatives 
in their quantificational readings. For instance, in (8) the superlative functions 
as a universal and in (9) as a negated existential. 
(8) The faintest noise bothers my uncle. 
(9) My neighbour is so nice that he is not bothered by the loudest noise. 
Fauconnier accounts for quantifying superlatives in terms of pragmatic 
scales. He argues that a sentence containing the faintest, for instance, will 
have a quantified reading in a context that presupposes a scale for which the 
superlative is a low point, cf. (8). The assumption is that if one is disturbed 
by a certain noise level, he is also disturbed by a louder noise. Negation pro-
duces the well-known scalar reverse effect, cf. (9) where the counterpart of 
existential any is realised by the 'opposite' superlative the loudest. 
If one keeps fixed the ranking of 'quantities', the direction of the infer-
ences on the scale depends on the properties of the verb, see the contrast be-
tween the positive sentences in (8) and (10) due to the fact that stand allows 
inferences from a large quantity to smaller ones. 
(10) He can stand any/*the faintest noise. 
Fauconnier makes a number of remarks that are of particular interest for 
our concern. He draws attention to the fact that examples like (11) and (12), 
which exhibit the same verb, are equally negated, but contain two superlatives 
that are one the opposite of the other, both have universal force and can be 
paraphrased by (13). 
1
The role of the PP as subtrigger might be relevant for a FC reading but not for the 
PS reading under discussion. 
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(11) He didn't hear the faintest noise. 
(12) He didn't hear the loudest noise. 
(13) He didn't hear any noise. 
He points out that the cooccurrence of adjectives that indicate a minimum 
quantity (that becomes a zero quantity in negative sentences) with predicates 
that do not imply the existence of their object, verbs of perception such as hear 
and verbs like notice, contra verbs that imply the existence of their objects 
such as pay attention, make it possible to have the same propositional frame 
to support inferencing from either end of a scale. 
In cases of double inferencing such as (11) and (12), it is (11) that seems 
to violate the predictions of the scale associated with not hear, because one ex-
pects loudest as a minimum. The reading implicating absence of noise would 
not hold for (11) had the verb been like in (14). In (14) the predicate pay 
attention implies that there were some noises, and they were ignored. The su-
perlative in (15) does not have a quantificational reading but is about a specific 
noise. 
(14) He didn't pay attention to any noise. 
(15) He didn't pay attention to the faintest noise. 
Thus, the presupposition of existence attached to the argument position of 
the verb in (14) somewhat inhibits the possibility of a quantificational reading 
for the superlative. This effect obtains also in the scope of negation. On the 
contrary, (13) can be used either to report that he didn ' t hear the noises there 
or that there were no noises to be heard there, i.e. as (12) or (11). 
Fauconnier claims that in the case of (11) 'the "minimum quantity" ad-
jectives can only be used in negated contexts with the same effect of any and 
contrary to the scale principle if the associated predicate does not imply ex-
istence of an object' (Fauconnier, 1975:367). In these cases the negation is 
used to suggest nonexistence of the object. In the case of the universal read-
ing of sentences such as (12), the existence of the object is implied. '[T]he 
correct scale is not directly associated with the logical form of the relevant 
sentences, rather it corresponds to an inferred existential statement' (Faucon-
nier, 1975:368). Thus, (11) commits the speaker or the subject ofthe sentence 
to the corresponding existential statement in (16). 
(16) There wasn ' t the faintest noise. 
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Interestingly, Fauconnier notes that cases that do not imply the existence 
of the object but rather suggest its nonexistence, focus on quantity rather than 
strictly on the relation expressed by the predicate. The scalar entailment be-
comes the most important piece of information conveyed by sentence (11). 
4 Mental Verbs 
The predicates that do not imply the existence of their object discussed by Fau-
connier are mainly MENTAL VERBS. Croft (1993) proposes a causal structure 
model of verb meaning which is intended to explain the relationship between 
lexical semantics and case assignment to the different arguments. Volition and 
causation play a prominent role in this model. In particular, in order to ac-
count for the variation in subject assignment across languages, Croft proposes 
two distinct ways of organising the causal chain that makes up the event de-
scribed by verbs of perception such as hear (more generally mental verbs). He 
claims that 'a mental state is actually a two-ways causal relation' depending 
on whether the perception of the stimulus by the experiencer is presented as in-
ternally motivated, i.e. her ability to focus on the stimulus is foregrounded, or 
externally motivated, i.e. the potential of the stimulus to get the experiencer's 
attention/consciousness is foregrounded. 
This distinction has been exploited to account for the fact that both su-
perlatives in (11) and (12) can get the quantificational interpretation in the 
same sentence frame He didn 't hear X (Israel, 2001). The two resulting propo-
sitions reflect different facets of the complex causal relation which is hearing. 
In (12), which contains the loudest, inferences are based on the experi-
encer's ability to perceive a noise. Fainter sounds are harder to perceive than 
louder ones, thus if one is not able to perceive even the loudest sound, which 
is the easiest to perceive, presumably he won't be able to perceive anything. 
Negating the most likely position on the pragmatic scale warrants the infer-
ence that all positions are negated for a hearer of a given auditory acuity. Loud 
noises are the strongest position on the scale. Inferences run from the strongest 
position to all the other positions on the scale. 
As for (11 ), which contains the faintest, the role of the stimulus's potential 
is expressed in terms of an existential scale ranking stimuli on the basis of their 
likely existence (Hoeksema and Rullmann, 2000). When louder sounds occur 
in a place, weaker sounds can also be found there, most likely. Alternatively, 
taking up Fauconnier's observation, when a large 'quantity of sound' is found, 
a 'smaller quantity' is also found. So, from the nonexistence of small quanti-
ties it is fairly safe to conclude that there are no sounds at all, independently of 
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the auditory acuity of the hearer. This time, inferences run from the minimum 
quantity position to all the other positions on the scale. 
5 A Two Direction Scale for deny 
5.1 Two uses of the verb 
The verb deny in (3)-(5) is used in two different ways. In (3) and (5) the verb is 
close to express existential negation. Negation is construed DESCRIPTIVELY 
(Hom, 1989), as the sentence in (3) is interpreted as asserting that there is no 
knowledge of the plot that is possessed by the entity in subject position. 
In (4), the verb ascribes falsity to its object. Here the denial has the 
form 'the accusations are not grounded'. The sentence conveys a rejection 
that seems close to what has been termed PRESUPPOSITION DENIAL (Geurts, 
1998) as the sentence is interpreted as asserting that the accusations that have 
been vented are false. 
The discussion of the uses of deny should be completed by including the 
cases where it has a 'not give' interpretation, usually associated with a double 
object construction. In (17) we have an instance that, being in the passive 
form, results in a reading that could be translated as 'not to be given', from 
which can be inferred 'not to have'. 
(17) Arthur tried to gauge the speed at which they were travelling, but the 
blackness outside was absolute and he was denied any reference points. 
(Douglas Adams, 1979, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, p. 158) 
The passive form in (17) is the type of occurrence commonly found in 
my collection of www texts. The active occurrence shown in (18) is unique 
and exhibits an any-phrase associated to the thematic role of patient with a 
beneficiary realised as a PP. It contains a case of FC any. No instances of the 
verb with the ditransitive pattern overtly realized were found. 
(18) [S]ince 1980 the Supreme Court has denied any First Amendment pro-
tection to child pornography[ ... ] 
( www. i tc. virgini a.edu/virginia.edu/ springO 1/cy berlaw /home. html) 
It has been observed (Shehadi, 1969), that there is a close link between 
'what exists' and 'what is true'. The verb deny, in its functioning detailed 
in this study, seems to suggest that we can say that there may be a possibly 
equally close link between 'what does not exist' and 'what is false'. In all 
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cases, the assertion of non existence has to be relativized to the point of view 
of the entity in subject position. This remark is consistent with data both on 
passive and active forms. 
5.2 1\vo directions for the two uses 
Capitalizing on Fauconnier's observation about the relevance of the existential 
implication on the direct object position, and by analogy to the case of mental 
verbs, we suggest that these two uses of deny also reflect a complex event 
structure that can be characterised via two distinct causal chains that give rise 
to inferences in opposite directions on a scale. 
The corresponding of Croft's ' two-ways causal relation' to be considered 
for deny depends on whether the existence/plausibility that the entity occupy-
ing the syntactic position of object has to the eyes of the entity in the syn-
tactic position of subject, is presented as being internally motivated, i.e. the 
(un)willingness of the subject to acknowledge the object as true/relevant is 
foregrounded, or externally motivated, i.e. the (lack of) potential of the ob-
ject/stimulus to impinge on the subject/experiencer's consciousness is fore-
grounded. 
Note that only in the former case the subject qualifies fully and exclusively 
as 'agent'. Only in the former case the existence of a nonempty domain of 
denotation for the noun in the NP in object position is independently implied. 
Let us see how this proposal applies to the data in (3)-(5). In (4), where 
deny reads as reject, inferences are based on the subject's volition to acknowl-
edge the object. The existence of the object is implied and could constitute 
the previous content that is denied by the whole sentence. The scale supports 
the inference that, if the subject is persuaded of the falsity of the 'stoutest' 
claim/accusation, or is not able to see its truth/relevance, she will consider 
false and reject also much weaker claims. The strongest position gets a quan-
tificational reading with universal logical force. This is the typical reading of 
any called free-choice. 
As for (3) and (5), where deny reads as ascribe no existence, the role of 
the object's potential is expressed in terms of an existential scale ranking ob-
jects on the basis of their likely existence. If there are manifestations of large 
quantities of a given (type of) entity, smaller quantities are also found. So, 
from the nonexistence of the smallest quantity it is fairly safe to conclude that 
there is no quantity at all, independently of the willingness of the subject to 
acknowledge its existence. The strongest position on the scale gets existen-
tial quantificational reading. This is the typical reading of any called polarity 
sensitive. 
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6 The Readings of any-Phrases 
6.1 The readings and the structure of the quantificational domain 
The possibility of having PS and FC readings for any shows that this item 
does not lexicalise a particular scalar endpoint like superlatives do, contrast 
(11) and (12) with (13). However, something must be added to account for the 
particular reading distribution exemplified in (3)-(5). 
The difference in the way the scale is interpreted and entailments run, has 
an effect that can be cashed on a quantifier in the following way. We take that 
the standard assumption of non-emptyness attached to the restrictor of a quan-
tifier is not uniquely defined by its being strong or weak, cf. (Milsark, 1977) 
and much subsequent work. We suggest that it also depends on the character-
isation of the argument position the quantifier occupies, which follows from 
the specification provided by the predicate. 
In the case of (4) the argument position can be occupied by a quantifier 
with a non empty restriction set. 
In the case of (3) and (5), what is negated is the existence of any instantia-
tion of the theN-predicate in the argument position. The latter can be occupied 
by a quantifier with an empty restriction set. 
A discretised domain of quantification is required to build a scale of the 
type used in (4), because distinct individuals are considered for the object 
position. Count nouns give access to individuals naturally. 
No such requirement applies for the scale used in (3) and (5), which can 
rank quantities. In this case, the impossibility of D-linking is exploited as a 
'smoke screen' that hides the identity of the entities in the count case, and 
induces a cardinality reading. Mass nouns naturally block lexical access to the 
units in the domain of denotation. Their denotation does not contain directly 
accessible individuals. Quantities do not support referential links. 
6.2 FC andPS 
How can we connect these considerations with the common opinion that any 
is a modal determiner? Note that the domain of the restriction of example (4), 
which contains any with a FC reading, includes actual and possible accusa-
tions . Indeed, it is expected to include actual instances, because the sentence 
is episodic, in the sense that it makes reference to (a) particular event(s). How-
ever, the sentence is not just about some particular actual instances. The unac-
ceptability of (19) shows that is not possible for the domain of the restrictor to 
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include only actual accusations.2 
(19) *She denied any accusations from John. 
Sentence (19) does not allow the reading 'any possible accusations' , as 
shown by the following contrast. 
(20) a. *John issued several serious accusations on Mary, but she flatly 
denied any of them 
b. . .. ,but she flatly denied each/all of them 
There is a set of actual entities in the denotation of the restrictor in the 
case of FC reading of any with deny, e.g. specific accusations in (4) because 
the sentence is episodic. This observation, consistent with our pretheoretical 
linguistic intuitions, is compatible with the observation that discourse indepen-
dence is relevant for PS readings to arise, cf. (5). However, these actual enti-
ties do not constitute the whole domain, because of the IRREFERENTIALITY 
of any (Jayez and Tovena, forthcoming) (Jayez and Tovena, to appear), recall 
the unacceptability of (19). In other words, in the case of ( 4) the real world 
satisfies certain propositions involving particular individuals, for instance the 
proposition that she rejected accusation a1 , a2 , ••• ,an, where au a2 , •• • ,an 
are the accusations vented in the discourse context, but these propositions do 
not determine the fact that she was in the disposition of rejecting all accusa-
tions. There is an extra piece of information which cannot be reduced to an 
enumeration. 
According to the constraint of Non-Individuation, any is not possible 
when the truth of the sentence where it occurs depends on the identity of the 
individuals which constitute the reference domain (Tovena, 1998). Any is li-
censed by negative predicates when the sentence does not describe particular 
events but rather a general attitude. For instance, the fact that (21a) is not just 
about a particular set of entities is consistent with the impossibility of overt 
discourse anaphora, see (21 b). 
(21) a. John refused any compromises 
b. John refused any compromisesi. Yet, *theyi were rather reason-
able. 
2For some speakers, the sentence is not cempletely excluded but they report a ha-
bitual reading where John is known to be a compulsive liar, which is consistent with 
our position. 
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In order to express Non-Individuation in a formal way, we need the notion 
of referentiality of a sentence defined in (Jayez and Tovena, forthcoming) via 
the two ordered constraints corresponding to VARIATION and DOMAIN SHIFT 
given in (22). 
(22) Referentiality of a sentence 
LetS be a sentence with a logical form ATT([FCI] [P] [Q]). 
1. The logical form must not be descriptive, and 
2. S should obey constraint (i) or, if this is impossible, constraint (ii) : 
(i) For every maximal set of worlds W' ~ W that satisfy S and where 
the denotation of the restriction P is the same and is non-empty, there 
is no individual c that satisfies Q (or •Q) every time it satisfies Pin 
W'. 
(ii) The denotation of P is not rigid. 
In caseS does not satisfy 1. and 2., it is referential. (Jayez and Tovena, 
forthcoming) 
Variation is akin to the idea that the any N phrase can refer to different 
N-entities in different worlds when the sentence hosting it is true. Domain 
shift shares with variation the fact that it involves several worlds, but it differs 
in that there is no choice of individual on a world-by-world basis. When the 
domain of the FC phrase is not rigid, any is acceptable with a FC reading, as 
in (23), because the different continuations of the current situation may shift 
between different sets of misdemeanors. 
(23) Punish any misdemeanor 
The definition of NI provided in (24) captures the property in virtue of 
which referential knowledge cannot specify completely the logical informa-
tion conveyed by the sentence containing a FCI. NI obtains in two cases: (i) 
either there is no referential knowledge proper (no individuation determined at 
speech time) or (ii) there is some extra logical information that is not reducible 
to referential knowledge. Case (i) corresponds to the possible existence in the 
future of mutually incompatible worlds. Case (ii) corresponds to the fact that 
a sentence hints at some conceptual dependency, which evades any purely ref-
erential characterization. 
(24) Formal definition of NI 
Let S be a sentence whose modal form is ATT ¢ and whose tripar-
tite structure is ATT([FCI] [P] [Q]), and let W be the set of possible 
ATT-accessible worlds . The FCI is licensed only if the information 
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concerning what makes P true or false cannot be reduced to referential 
information. (Jayez and Tovena, forthcoming) 
In order to take into consideration the PS behaviour of any and French le 
moindre, Jayez and Tovena (2003) estend NI into Non Situatedness. 
(25) Non Situatedness 
Any and le moindre are appropriate only in sentences whose truth does 
not depend on a particular set of situated-i.e. spatia-temporally loca-
ted--eventualities, inside the main spatia-temporal trace. (Jayez and 
Tovena, 2003) 
Downward entailing contexts do not presuppose particular situated events. 
E.g., in Last month Daniel didn't read any book there is no situated event 
of non-reading a particular book inside the main spatia-temporal trace. For 
instance, the fact that Daniel did not read book b spans the whole month trace, 
but cannot be situated at some location inside this trace. 'Negative events' are 
impossible if they are situated, cf. (19). 
Negative predicates in general deny the existence of any event associated 
with their NP complement. The way events are associated with NPs varies 
according to the semantic class of the NP and the information attached to the 
head noun. For instance, John refused three apples is most naturally inter-
preted as ' there are three apples such that John refused that there be an event 
of taking I eating I etc., them' . The predicates ' take', 'eat', etc. can be added 
to the semantic representation because they are associated with the noun apple. 
When the head noun denotes an event, we do not need to interpolate a par-
ticular predicate. For instance John refused three compromises means 'there 
are three compromises such that John refused that there be an event which re-
alizes them' . This interpretation is only possible for certain kinds of nouns. 
Entities of type object (vs event) or event-denoting nouns which do not easily 
refer to potential events with a sentence in the past are not appropriate with all 
or some negative predicates. 
The fact that negative predicates may enter non-referential interpretations 
is in agreement with the proposals by Zimmermann (1993), Krifka (1995) and 
Moltmann (1997) that these verbs are ' intensional', i.e. do not take individuals 
but properties or quantifiers as objects. 
The difference between the cases in (3)-(5) is the following. We have non-
existence in the case of (3) and (5), and domain shift in the case of (4). The 
sentence in (4) means that 'she communicated that any possible accusation 
was misguided' . This implies that the person in question 'denies' also the 
actual accusations, but not just them. There is a fixed and rigid set of (real) 
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accusations and in addition a set of future accusations that varies according to 
the different continuations. 
7 Tying up Loose Ends 
Sentences containing deny are relevant in the discussion of weak islands. The 
approach defended in this study is compatible with the algebraic perspective 
on scope interaction proposed for the weak island effects by Szabolcsi and 
Zwarts (1993). Recall that treatments such as Progovac's are crucial for a 
movement based syntactic account of the contrast in (26), because they bring 
about an intervener in (26b) but not in (26a). Next, the contrast between (26b) 
and (26c) has been dealt with by stipulating that only D-linked wh-phrases can 
extract, see (Rizzi, 1990) and followers . 
(26) a. How did he deny it? 
b. *How did he deny that he solved the problem __ ? 
c. Which man did you deny that I invited __ ? 
Szabolcsi and Zwarts have argued that when a wh-phrase scopes over 
some scopal element SE, the operations associated with that SE are performed 
in its denotation domain. Characteristic of bad extractees is their lack of indi-
viduality. The term non-individual is used for instance to refer to mass terms 
and amounts. Non-individuals are characterised by the fact that they exhibit a 
partial ordering which has to be taken into consideration when computing the 
answer to a question. 
In the cases under consideration in this study, no movement has been pos-
tulated. The effect of the presence of a SE is to be exploited for any-phrases 
in a different way. Considering the issue in terms of scope relations, Tovena 
(1998, ch.5) has noted that the possibility of outscoping downward monotone 
SEs results in the availability of a FC reading for any-phrases, although they 
are not required to outscope and the impossibility does not result in ungram-
maticality as for wh-phrases. From our current point of view, we observe first, 
that S-complements denote in the domain of propositions, which is not rigid, 
hence it allows for domain shift. Therefore, we predict that they pair with mass 
and event nouns and can be classified as licensing environments. Second, as 
noted in (To vena, 1998), Szabolcsi 's observation that propositions are ordered 
(by entailment) makes it possible to extend to S-complements the treatment of 
mass NP-complements and to account for the absence of meaning alternation 
of any inside S-complements, see (27). 
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(27) a. The librarian denied that any book had been stolen. 
b. The officer denied that any information had been leaked from his 
office. 
The unacceptability of (2) is another crucial piece of data for a theory 
that postulates a licensing difference for NP and S complements. To account 
for this case we propose that the absence of an overt domain for the restrictor 
may be the relevant fact. This absence makes it impossible to identify the con-
ceptual dependency used to produce the extra bit of information that exceeds 
what we can get in referential terms. Hence the sentence has only an episodic 
reading, which is incompatible with the constraint of Non Individuation. 
8 Conclusion 
We have shown that the content of transitive deny with an NP complement 
reflects a complex event structure that can be characterised via two distinct 
causal chains that give rise to inferences in opposite directions on a scale. 
Verb readings have been linked to any-phrase readings by saying that in 
the 'say it is false' reading of deny, inferences are based on the subject's vo-
lition to acknowledge the object and the implication of existence on the argu-
ment position is compatible with a FC reading of any-phrases. In the 'assess 
non-existence' reading, there is a quantity scale where entities are ranked ac-
cording to their likely existence, and any-phrases receive a PS reading. 
Finally, the alternation under discussion is compatible with a view of any 
as an irreferential determiner. 
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